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Ethics: theoretical or practical 
science?
"The problem of reconciling reality and 
thought about reality is as old as philos= 
ophy - we might say,, as old as thought it= 
self ... In a certain sense the history 
of philosophy is the record of a series of 
attempts to make this reconciliation" 
Quentin Lauer: Phenomenology. Its genesis and 
prospects. New York, Harper & Row, 1965 
p 5, 6.
"Theory and practice", the theme of the present 
congress, *^  is definitely not a novelty. It is 
one of the oldest problems of mankind. The two 
guestions "What is the case?" and "What is to be 
done?" have always accompanied each other like 
twin brothers. The problem of previous ages, viz 
the correct relationship between the two, is still 
an issue today. It happened in the history of 
Western thought that the pendulum swung between 
two extremes: some regarded the theoretical and 
others the practical approach as of primary import^ 
ance. As usually happens in the case of difficult 
problems a third group tried to compromise with a 
position in between.
Today we have a noteworthy tendency of renewed em= 
phasis on the practical application of science in 
all spheres of life. Questions like the follow= 
ing are urgent: How do scholars treat issues pre= 
sented to them by society, and should they? How 
do scholarly results get "translated" into non-
*. Referaat voorberei vir die internasionale kon= 
gres oor "Teorie en praktyk" wat vanaf 8-15 
September 197 6 te Genoa en Barcelona gehou is.
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scholarly categories? Can only academic research 
be justified which has an immediate relevance for 
society? etc.
Many leaders, in especially the Third World count= 
ries, today want the university to be fully com= 
mitted to active participation in social transfor= 
mation, economic modernization and the amelioration 
of the conditions of life and work of ordinary men 
and women. The university must not pursue know= 
ledge for its own sake. It should place emphasis 
on that which is immediately relevant and useful.1)
1. Introduction
The ordinary usage of "theory" and "practice" is 
marked by a sharp distinction; sometimes accent= 
uated by a polar opposition. This contrast is 
for instance, clear in the exploration of the word 
"theory" in the Oxford English Dictionary. "True in 
theory but false in practice" is a well-known idea. 
The common man, distrustful of intellect when not 
directed to immediate practical ends, speaks of 
theory in disparaging tones. We get the idea 
that "theory and practice" is an opposition of 
mutually exclusive elements of human life.
This distinction is used in different areas. For 
instance to characterize or qualify certain branch= 
es of sciences like, for example, theoretical and 
practical (or applied) paedagogics, theoretical 
and practical chemistry, biology etc. In exami= 
nations a division is often made between a theore= 
tical and practical part.2)
Some people do speak about "practical Philosophy" 
but for most of us this sounds like a contradictio 
in terminis. People usually think philosophers are 
absentminded, dwelling in the clouds, lacking the 
know-how of practical life. Philosophical dis= 
cussions can - without any loss - be dismissed to 
the realm of theory which has no intrinsic connec= 
tion with our practical problems and daily routine. 
The philosopher is estranged from life. In his 
glorious isolation he acts as an interpreter or 
spectator from the tribune.
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Of course not all philosophers were quite satis= 
fied with this idea about philosophy. According 
to Karl Marx the time for a static interpretation 
of reality has passed. The real task of philos= 
ophy is to change reality dynamically.3) Not 
interpretation and knowledge are the most impor= 
tant, but change and action. The philosopher 
should not be a passive spectator from the tribune 
but active in the arena.
When isolated from life philosophy becomes a 
meaningless enterprise. When totally absorbed in 
practical life it is murdered because it loses its 
character. What exactly is the task then of 
philosophy?
In this paper I will confine myself to the science 
of Ethics as an illustration of the problem of 
theory and practice in philosophy. Usually Ethics 
is regarded as a practical science. It is the 
science in which (Moral) Philosophy approaches the 
closest towards everyday life.
Before we embark on a discussion of the problems 
around Ethics a brief survey of Western philosophy 
may be worthwile in order to ascertain how various 
philosophers and philosophical currents viewed the 
problem of theory and practice.
2. In survey: some viewpoints throughout history
The famous Greek philosopher, Socrates, was a prop= 
onent of praotioalism. He was convinced that if 
somebody has a correct understanding of a situation, 
he will act morally correctly. Proper insight 
leads to proper action. Also, according to the 
Stoics, vice consisted in ignorance and good in= 
sight guarantees correct action. The Epicurians 
held the same practicalistic idea that vice is 
merely the result of false judgement.
These ancient practicalists, men of action, em= 
phasised the necessity of insight in order to be 
able to act correctly. By "insight", however, 
they did not understand scientific thought but 
pre-scientific, practical thinking.
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The science of Ethics, being the focal point of 
philosophical speculation, flourished in these 
different types of practicalistic philosophies.
The concept of "theory" refers to the Greek term 
"theoria" which originally had a cultic and relig= 
ious emphasis. It combines theos (god) and horTXo 
(see), and serves to indicate an elevated cultic 
spectacle. (Consequently, a thefiros was also the 
spectator of a cultic-festival.)
In this original use of the term theoria the 
thought which comes to the fore in time of Plato 
and Aristotle is already present, namely theoria 
as a view of reality, a meditation on form. By 
them the reflective capacity of man is promoted to 
the highest factor of elucidation. To be able to 
see the truth, this concept must be completely 
divorced from sensory representations. As a re= 
suit of this emphasis on the abstract concept a 
schism developed between philosophy and daily 
experience, between theory and practice.
Plato is not interested in the world of phenomena, 
but only in eternal, superhuman ideas. Thought is 
thus detached from daily experience. Theoretical 
knowledge is ascetic knowledge. The scholar stands 
estranged from the world, over against the people 
of daily experience - the bios theoretikus as against 
the bios praktikos. (Cf Socrates' narrative of the 
philosopher Thalos who, absorbed in thought and 
gazing at the stars, fell into a well.') Plato 
indeed admits that philosophy has a practical, 
forming value; but this value does not, however, 
negate the original alienation of theoria from 
daily, naive experience: man has always still to 
choose either the theoretical or the practical 
attitude towards life.
Because for Aristotle the ideas or forms must be 
sought not in a supra-sensory region but rather 
in concrete things, his theoria brings him a little 
nearer to practice. He distinguishes the theoret= 
ical and the practical according to their separate 
goals: the final goal of the first is truth, and 
that of the second is action. The theoretical 
has eternal truth or principles, and the practical
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the temporary or present, in mind. Unlike Plato, 
Aristotle made the distinction of a three- faceted 
life-form: bios theoretikos, bios praktikos and bios 
apolaustikos. The first-mentioned is the highest 
form of life because within it the divine is most 
closely approached, and it leads thus to eudaimonia. 
In the second, lower, practical life-form (which 
includes political life) man no longer seeks 
eudaimonia but rather honour ( time) . The lowest 
form - which man has in common with the animals - is 
the bios apolaustikos} in which man seeks pleasure in 
order to satisfy his sensual urges.
Aristotle does not regard these three life-forms 
as alternatives, since man can progress from one 
to the other. He finds, then, an element of 
theoria in the two lower phases also. Even the 
practical man ought to reflect on what he has in 
mind, and the hedonist should act with due con= 
sideration. Against Plato, who reserves theoria as 
the way of life for a few adepts, it is thus for 
Aristotle a way of life which stands open for all 
men. Both however agree that the bios theoretikos 
is a meditation of form wherein man becomes of 
like form to the gods and thus reaches his highest 
felicity.
During the Middle Ages we encounter the important 
distinction between intellect and will: the first 
knows the truth and the last loves the good.
According to Thomas Aquino the intellect is more 
important than the will. Accordingly he built up 
an intellectualistic Ethics. According to John 
Duns Scotus, however, the will is the nobler facul= 
ty in man because of its commanding position in 
human activity. It even commands the intellect: 
we know only because we will to do so. According= 
ly his Ethics bears a voluntaristic tendency. 
Ethics is not a theoretical but practical science.
In earlier Rationalistic philosophy we first get a 
strong current of scientialism (circa 1600-1700). 
By the term "Scientialism" I mean the exaggeration 
of (theoretical)reason. Adherents of this type of 
philosophy believed that reason could also control 
the doing, the praxis of man. Scientialism was
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interested in practice but primarily from a theo= 
rectical or scientific point of view. Sciential= 
istic Rationalism advocated a natural, tpathematic= 
ally scientific ideal which could not do justice 
to the totality of practical experience.
In reaction against scientialism the following 
movement in rationalistic philosophy, called 
Enlightenment, dominated the scene from approximate= 
ly 1700-1800. This type of rationalism realized 
that apart from theoretical, scientific knowledge 
practical knowledge is as important because a 
large area of human knowledge does not presuppose 
theoretical analyses. Life is more than merely 
(mathematical - scientific) theory. Language, 
technology, society, ethical and economic life, 
politics, arts, education, in other words all the 
supra - analytical dimensions of human existence, 
are no longer to be approached merely scientific= 
ally or theoretically but in a practical manner. 
Such practical knowledge is not necessarily the 
consequence of theoretical analysis. The philos= 
ophers of the Enlightenment realized that distor= 
tions will be the result when scientific theory 
controls practical life.
In this renewed rationalistic form of what we al= 
ready called practicalism in Socrates and Hellen= 
istic philosophy, practical, pre-scientific know= 
ledge is placed on the same level as scientific 
knowledge, even more importance is attributed to 
it. There is however a marked difference from 
ancient practicalism. Socratic practicalism simp= 
ly used to mean good (practical) insight which 
guaranteed the correct action. Now it acquires a 
rationalistic tone. The insight is now a practic= 
al a-priori, the practical reason. In the eight= 
eenth century there was a great desire to apply 
the a-priori principles of rationalism concretely, 
in all areas of life. The broader view of the 
"Aufklarung" philosophers, compared with the 
scientalists of the seventeenth century, was much 
more influential and culturally more significant. 
Practicalistic rationalism spread far and wide. 
Ethics became so important that we may speak of 
moralism amongst some of these kinds of philos= 
ophers.
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The third current in earlier rationalistic philos= 
ophy, called Idealism, was an attempt to reconcile 
the scientialistic and practicalistic forms of 
rationalism by accepting one reason with a theo= 
retical and practical "compartment".
I Kant (1724-1804), the world famous philosopher 
from Koningsberg, was the father of this type of 
philosophy. In his most significant works 
Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason and 
Critique of Judgment he discussed the domains of 
theoretical reason, practical reason and the com= 
bination of theoretical and practical "ratio".
Apart from these main works some of his smaller 
works provide interesting material about his views 
on theory and practice, for instance Was heisst: 
sich im denken orientieren? (Immanuel Kant Werke in Zehn 
Banden by Wilhelm Weischedel, Vol 5, p 265-283) and 
especially his Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der 
Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber niaht fur die Praxis of 
1793 (Immanuel Kant Werke in Zehn Banden by Wilhelm 
Weischedel, Vol 9, p 125-172). In this work it is 
clear that the priority Kant ascribed to the prac= 
tical above the theoretical reason does not imply 
priority of practice above theory. Kant is clear= 
ly not in agreement with the opposition between 
theory and practice. He makes the interesting 
statement that, if a theory does not work in prac= 
tice, the fault is not necessarily the theory but 
it may be that the scientist did not have 
sufficient theoretical knowledge to apply it suc= 
cessfully in practice!
The period of late rationalism (roughly 19th cen= 
tury) consists of three currents which resemble 
the three stages of early rationalism: first the 
scientialism of the positivists, secondly the 
practicalism of the neo-positivists and thirdly a 
movement which tried to reconcile the previous 
two, viz neo-idealism. In a different form the 
old problem of theory and practice returned once 
again in late rationalism.
In the 19th century already the ideas of men like 
F Nietzsche and S Kierkegaard had heralded the end 
of the "Age of Reason". Irrationalism became one
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of the leading philosophic currents in the twen= 
tieth century. As the name indicates it is a re= 
action to rationalism, anti-rationalism. Irra= 
tionalism, however, is not a philosophy void of 
reason. Irrasionalistic philosophers still accept= 
ed science but the signifance of reason is releg= 
ated to a rather small area. Reason and theoret= 
ical knowledge is dethroned but not put out of 
commission altogether. Depending upon the type of 
irrationalism a certain domain of human life (the 
irrational) escapes the scope of reason. Reality 
is not merely a rational reality, all of life is 
not causally determinded or scientifically predict= 
able.
Irrationalism is a philosophy of practice. Though 
at a distance, this type of philosophy follows 
Immanuel Kant's philosophy. His division of reason 
into a theoretical and practical reason was intend= 
ed to make room for the practical facets of life, 
e g the freedom and ethical responsibility of man. 
Man should not bow under theoretical reason in the 
moral decisions to be made. Ethical life proceeds 
from an origin, though still a rational one of its 
own. Irrationalism went further on the ~ame road 
and substituted for Kant's practical reason the 
practical free act - not regulated by reason. It 
abandoned the idea of a universal rational-moral 
law and replaced it with human autonomy and creat= 
ive freedom.
Pragmatism, one twig on the branch of irrational= 
ism (the two other irrationalistic currents are 
"Lebensphilosophie" and Existentialism) proclaimed 
that truth cannot be expressed merely in theoretic 
concepts. Theory is meaningful only when it pru= 
motes practical usefulness. An idea is not true 
until it becomes true in a practical situation.
In reviewing the history of Western thought it is 
clear that whenever emphasis was placed on the so- 
called practical side of human life interest in 
ethical problems awakened. It seems to be a fixed 
idea throughout Western philosophy that Ethics has 
as its definite field of investigation the practi= 
cal conduct of man.
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The very strong tradition of regarding the prac= 
tical as the field of study of Ethics is still to= 
day clearly reflected in most contemporary defini= 
tions of this discipline. A choice at random will 
prove this.
+ Mackenzie, A manual of ethics-.
"Ethics may be defined as the study of what is 
right of good in conduct. It is the general 
theory of conduct and considers the actions of 
human beings with reference to their rightness 
or wrongness, their tendency to good or evil... 
Ethics ... we may say, discusses men's habits 
and customs, or in other words their characters, 
the principles on which they habitually act, 
and considers what it is that constitutes the 
rightness or wrongness of those principles, the 
good and evil of those habits."
+ Cronin, Science of ethics:
"Ethics may be defined as the science of human 
conduct as according with human reason and 
directed by reason towards man's natural, final 
end. "
+ Carritt in The theory of morals. An introductv~n to 
ethical Philosophy concentrates his study of 
Ethics on what duty is:
"What then is the nature and authority of duty? 
What are our duties? What makes it right?"
+ Frankena, Ethics:
"Ethics is the systematic study of human actions 
from the point of view of their rightness or 
wrongness as means for the achievement of ulti= 
mate happiness."
From these definitions of Ethics the following de= 
ductions can be made about the subject matter of 
this science:
1. Practical life.
2. The human being (his character, habits, duties, 
virtues, pleasures, happiness and finrl end).
3. Human conduct.
3 . In critique: traditional viewpoints about Ethics
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4. Human conduct according to principles.
5. Good and bad conduct or judgements.
My main point of criticism is that the traditional 
idea of the praxis as the field of study of Ethics 
misled moral philosophers to assign a far too broad 
spectrum of life to investigation by the science 
of Ethics.
If we assume (more or less in the line of the 
Western tradition) the practical side of life to 
be the non-scientific (in the sense of pre-scien= 
tific) or non-theoretical part of life, it is 
necessary to notice that the concept of a "prac= 
tical life" is a very vague one. Practical life 
displays a rich diversity. It consists of a 
variety of at least fifteen different aspects: ’ 
the arithmetic or numerical (discrete quantity), 
spatial (continuous extension), kinematic (motion), 
physical (energy), biotic (vitality/life), sensi= 
tive or psychic (feeling), logical (distinction), 
historical (formative power), lingual (symbolic 
meaning), social (intercourse), economic (frugal= 
ity in managing scarce goods), aesthetic (harmony^ 
juridical (retribution), moral (troth) and pistic 
(faith or assurance). The ethical or moral is 
only one aspect of multi-dimensional reality.
If Ethics has the whole (practical) life as its 
field of investigation the implication is that it 
is a universal science, a hegemony of this science 
over all the other disciplines which are either 
merely subdivisions of this all - encompassing 
Ethics or have no right of independent existance 
at all.
My contention is that Ethics is a special science 
which studies a specific facet of reality, viz the 
moral aspects. The traditional concepts about the 
ethical (as identical with the practical) are far 
too broad. The whole of (practical) reality can 
not be viewed through the keyhole of the ethical.1 '
Lacking clear distinctions the "ethical box" is 
given any size, shape and content. Ethics is not 
clearly distinguished from, for instance, 
Anthropology (Bingswanger), Cultural Philosophy
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(Scheler), Paedagogy (Bollnow), Political Science 
(Brunner), Sociology (Neurath and De Rougemont), 
Dogmatics (Barth), Linguistics (Hare), Psychology 
(Schlick and Spranger), Ecclesiology (Althaus and 
Heim), etc.
Against this background it will be clear why I 
cannot accept the five viewpoints about Ethics 
listed above.
1. The origin of the distinction "theoretical/ 
rational - ethical" should be obvious from our 
historical survey of Western Thought. It is de= 
rived from the ancient distinction between theory 
and practice. Man, however, is not merely a 
rational - ethical being but his existence displays 
a variety of aspects. Apart from the rational (or 
logical) and moral (or ethical) facets, we disting= 
uished above at least thirteen other different as= 
pects. Therefore it would be just as arbitrary and 
incomplete a definition to call man an historico- 
lingual being. We should be on our guard against 
those merely one- and two-dimentional viewpoints 
about man in which the history of Western thought 
abounds (Cf homo orans, homo economicus, homo viator and 
today I'horme révoltê).
2. For the same reason Ethics cannot have as field 
of study the habits, character, duties, virtues etc 
of the human being. Man's habits, character etc 
may have an ethical aspect which can be the subject 
matter of this science. Habits, character and so 
forth as such, however, should not be regarded as 
its field of study. Economic habits, religions 
duties, social virtues are something different 
from ethical habits, duties etc and should be stud= 
ied in the respective sciences, viz Economics, 
Theology and Sociology. If we do not draw a clear 
line of demarcation the consequence will be that 
there is no difference whatsoever between Ethics 
and Anthropology.
3. The same remarks are applicable to the idea 
that human conduct should be ascribed to Ethics. ' 
When Ethics studies ethically qualified conduct, 
then we would agree. It can by no means have as 
field of study the whole range of human conduct
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and activity. Man is always busy in a variety of 
at least fifteen different activities.
Some moral philosophers have introduced a sup= 
plementary criterion: not all human conduct, but 
specifically human conduct in relation to one's fel= 
lowmen.8) This is a slight improvement - because 
it excludes, for instance, one's conduct in rela= 
tion to God which, to my mind, is definitely not 
of a moral but a religious nature. Still "conduct 
in human relationships" is much too wide. The 
human being can act in biological, psychical, 
juridical, lingual, and many more relationships 
towards his fellowmen. All these types of activi= 
ty should be studied by Biology, Psychology, and 
the Sciences of Law (Jurisprudence) and Linguis= 
tics. Otherwise Ethics could not be safeguarded 
against imperialism in the field of science. 
Because many theologians also accepted the idea of 
Ethics being the study of human conduct in rela= 
tionships to one's fellowmen, and because they 
divided the Decalogue into two parts (the first 
four and last six commandments) of which the 
second regulates human relationships, they also 
considered the so-called second table of the Law 
of God as part of their Ethical studies. I can= 
not agree with this division between religious 
laws (first table) and ethical commandments 
(second table). All ten commandments of the 
Decalogue are laws of the covenant, religious in 
character. Man's relation towards his fellowmen 
is also part of his religion. Again: these 
commandments also have an ethical aspect but they 
are definitely not purely ethical as such.
4. Yet another view about this much disputed 
science is that it should confine itself to the 
principles of human conduct. (As illustrated in 
the survey of history the Rationalists emphasised 
a-priori practical moral principles. Practical 
conduct should be directed by good insight.) The 
idea that Ethics has the monopoly of studying 
matters of normativity is wrong. Many moralists 
today are of the opinion that all questions about 
what one ought to do automatically are ethical in 
nature. Man, however, ought to do many things:
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promote justice, love his neighbour, serve his 
country, etc.
There is no such a thing as an "universal ought". 
Upon investigation this so-called universal ethic= 
al "ought" falls apart into various "oughts". An 
ought is not as such necessarily ethical.9)
Because all the abovementioned aspects of life are 
subjected each to its own norms or principles we 
get a logical ought, an historical ought, a 
lingual, social, economic, esthetic and ethical 
(moral) ought. "Ought" always bears a qualifica= 
tion.
Ethics should also study, apart from ethical phen= 
omena, the ethical norms which indicate what man 
ought to do, how to act in this specific facet of 
life. I may add here that the contrast between 
description - evaluation is untenable. It is im= 
possible to study ethical (or any other human) 
"facts" apart from values. (Values viewed as the 
answers or reactions of the human being to the 
norms.) Every human act reveals a positive or 
negative answer to the norms in a certain domain 
of life, be it ethical, juridical or economical. 
Ethics cannot be a merely descriptive science with= 
out any prescriptions because as a human being one 
knowlingly or unknowingly passes certain judgements 
which cannot be neutral. In the light of the above 
the old theological distinction between - Dogmatics 
and Ethics, viz that the first should study the 
norma eredendorum (norms of belief) or aredenda and 
the last the norma agendorum ( norms of conduct) or 
faoienda is also unacceptable.1 *^)
5. The current idea about what ought to be done 
brings us to the next, viz that Ethics has to do 
with good and bad, right and wrong in conduct. My 
reply in this case could be predicted by this time. 
I am repeating - monotonously, I agree - that good 
and bad are not specific ethical concepts. One may 
speak about a good or bad piece of art, good or bad 
biological or psychical conditions, a good or bad 
usage of language, good and bad judgements, and so 
forth. Because after original sin the good - had 
distinction goes right through the whole cosmos, 
we get economical or uneconomical, logical or
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illogical, moral and immoral behaviour. Good and 
evil bear different meanings dependent on the area 
of concern. To compose a bad (grammatically in= 
correct) sentence or to behave socially incorrect= 
ly is not to be guilty of an immoral uct. Ethics 
should confine itself to the morally good and bad.
It is important to distinguish here between the 
immoral and the amoral. The field of study of 
Ethics is the moral aspect of life including the 
morally good as well as the immoral (ethically - 
bad). Its field of study is not the a-moral (non- 
ethical), in other words the economically, juridic= 
ally etc good and bad.
4. In Outline: a new perspective
In this concluding perspective I will first make 
a few comments about the relationship between 
theory and practice in order to be able, in the 
second place, to add something about ethics as 
special science.
4 .1 Theory and practice
There is a difference between a mother's knowledge 
about the illness of her sick baby and the diag= 
nosis of the medical professor. The judgement of 
a woman buying expensive cosmetics and the econom= 
ist's reflection on the buying habits of women 
differ. The same difference exists between a 
mother's advice to her daughter and the ethicist's 
reflection on the ethical aspect of her advice.
This difference is the difference between pre- 
scientific (if you wish "practical") knowledge and 
theoretical, scientific knowledge.
We should clearly distinguish these two types of 
human knowledge but must never see them in opposi= 
tion to each other as has happened throughout the 
history of Western thought and as is still the 
case in ordinary language. Usually pre-scient=
ific knowledge is regarded as practical and scient= 
ific knowledge as impractical. The truth is that 
both kinds of knowledge are practical. The differ= 
ence between the professor of medicine and the
214
medical doctor is not that the one is a theorist 
and the other a practitioner, but rather that it 
is the practice of the former to investigate cer= 
tain aspects of human illness and to impart the 
results of these investigations to the students 
who wish to become doctors, whereas it is the 
practice of the latter to use the knowledge thus 
acquired to cure people in whom these aspects 
appear to be malfunctioning. The activities of 
both are very practical even though one man is 
theoretical and the other is not.
Not theory is opposed to practice, but impractical 
to practical. It is therefore important to distin= 
quish between practical (and impractical) activit= 
ies of a theoretical, and such activities of a non- 
theoretical nature. What is usually considered as 
a practical activity can be very impractical, and 
at the same time a theoretical activity can be 
very practical I
The pre-scientific is not unscientific but non- 
scientific. It is of another kind than scientific 
knowledge and therefore would be judged by other 
standards than those of science. Consequently 
there is no difference in value between scientific
and pre-scientific.12)
The difference between those two kinds of know= 
ledge is that pre-scientific knowledge comes 
earlier. Naive experience (from Latin nativum, 
meaning "original") precedes science, it is a 
necessary condition for the acquisition of theoret= 
ical knowledge. The fact that pre-theoretical 
knowledge is less complicated than theoretical 
knowledge does not therefore imply that the former 
is of less value.
These two types of knowledge are not mutually ex= 
elusive but mutually complementary. Practical 
pre-scientific knowledge (including one's view of 
life and world) directs one's scientific endeavours 
while scientific knowledge may help us to attain a 
deeper insight into our daily "practical" activit= 
ies.
Therefore our view of life (or philosophy, as the
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theoretical explication of our "Weltanschauung") 
is not isolated from our daily walk of life but 
part of it.*3) our walk ("lewenswandel") is 
closely bound to our philosophy of life ("lewens= 
visie") since the serious walker looks about him 
and orientates himself as he goes. He knows both 
his destination and the various stages of his 
journey as he reaches them.
I reject scientialism in which too great a role 
has been assigned in life to scientia, science. 
Scientism is not the same as science. It is a 
conviction of faith about the place of science in 
the whole of our life. The scientistic (not 
scientific) thinker has wrongly identified all 
proper knowledge with scientific knowledge.14)
For example: to speak of the sun's going down is 
not an unscientific or primitive statement 
because according to modern science there is no 
(beautiful) sunset!
Recapitilating on what has already been said about 
reality consisting of at least fifteen different 
modalities or aspects, I have the following con= 
eluding remarks. Firstly: In the dist.; notion 
theory - practice the theoretical (Logical) is 
contrasted with the rest of reality. From the pre= 
ceding it will be clear now that this is not 
necessary. There is no opposition between the 
theoretical and "the rest". Secondly: the "rest" 
is usually viewed under a single denominator, 
namely the ethical/moral. It will be as obvious 
now that to designate all a-theoretical as prac= 
tical or ethical is not correct. Reality reveals 
a richness not to be captured in a single concept.
4. 2 'rhe essence of the ethical
In the third part of this paper I was busy peeling 
an onion so to speak. One layer after another was 
rejected (practice, human relationships, conduct, 
ought, good and bad) because it was not the kernel 
or nucleus of the ethical. If the ethical cannot 
be identified with the practical, conduct etc, 
what then? Is the essence loyalty, respect, re= 
sponsibility,15) solidarity,16) l o v e ? ! 7 )
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The question about the kernel is not a speculative 
but a very practical, urgent question as it will 
enable us to draw a line of demarcation between 
Ethics and all the other special sciences as far 
as their fields of investigation are concerned. 
Although it is true that reality has an ethical 
aspect, it is very difficult to describe and im= 
possible to define absolutely surely its kernel 
moment. This is due to the a-logical, irreducible 
nature of the kernel moments of all aspects of 
reality. Science has to recognize its impotence 
to grasp exactly what the "essence" (not in the 
sense of law) of the ethical is.
The best definition thusfar, I think is that of 
troth.I®) "Troth is an old English term for truth, 
faithfulness, loyalty, and honesty. The single 
word troth captures the nuances of trust, reliabil= 
ity, stability, scrupulousness, ingenuousness, 
authenticity, integrity, and fidelity. To be fic= 
kle, capricious, unreliable, shifty, whimsical, 
disloyal, rootless, perfidious is to be anything 
but trothful."19) Troth is a facet of God's 
many-sided call to love. Just as thrift is the 
economic expression, so justice is the juridic ex= 
pression and troth the moral expression of the 
central commandment of love.
Whereas the state is qualified by the juridical, 
the business enterprise by the economic and the 
church by the pistical aspect, marriage, family 
and friendship relationships are qualified by 
troth or fidelity. Of course marriage, family and 
friendship also have economic, lingual, esthetical, 
social etc facets when analyzed philosophically 
but the ethical is the pilot of qualifying func= 
tion. The science of Ethics will therefore have 
as its field of study these three societal rela= 
tionships especially. (Of course also other 
sciences may investigate marriage and family rela= 
tions from their respective vantage points.) This 
does not imply that nothing else should be the 
subject matter of Ethics. Because the state, 
school, church, university and sportsclub also 
have ethical facets these may also be investigated 
by the ethicist.
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Time and space do not permit me to work out in 
details this new perspective on the science of 
ethics. X prefer to leave it for the moment in 
its embryo stage to provide some time for discus= 
sion.
I hope my main contention is clear.
Ethics is not the dull hobby of an even duller 
academician. It is an important science. Because 
it is a science - and to my mind a science with a 
limited scope - it is not void of meaning but full 
of practical relevance.
Philosophical, abstract, theoretical reflection is 
not a racking of the brains about matters which 
never trouble the average man. In the previous 
pages Philosophy helped us to attain more clarity 
about different issues especially the vexing prob= 
lem of theory and practice. We must philosophize 
or ... fossilize. Aristotle once said: "Whether 
we will philosophize, or whether we won't philos= 
ophize, we must philosophize."20)
B J van der Walt 
PU for CHE
218
REFERENCES
1. Cf the different papers delivered at a conference on "The 
role of universities in Southern Africa" organized by the 
"Centre for Intergroup Studies" at the University of Cape 
Town, Rondebosch 7700, South Africa. Especially these of 
A Wandira (Swaziland), T G Zengeni (Rhodesia) and W M 
Kwagare (South Africa).
2. Cf Chapter I of W Young, Foundations of Theory. Nutley, N J 
Craig Press, 1967 on the historical backgrounds of the dist­
inction between theory and practice. Also R Eisler's 
"WSrterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe III, Berlin, S Mittler & 
Sohn, 1910 sub voce "Theorie" (p 1506-7).
3. Cf, his Thesen iiber Feuerbach, no 11. Cf in this connection 
also J Habermas, Theory and practice (translated by J Viertel). 
London, Heinemann, 1974. Interesting reading about the 
relation between philosophy and practical life is offered
by P G W du Plessis, Praktiese Filosofie. Bulletin van die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Vereniging vir die bevordering van Chrietelike Weten= 
skap, nr 48/49:18-26, April/June 1976.
4. The Existentialistic viewpoints about ethics is discussed by 
P G W du Plessis in the following publications: Grepe uit 
die eksistensialistiese etiek. Koers, 25(3) 207-14, Dec.
1957; Enkele gesigspunte in die huidige etiek. Nederduits 
Gereformeerde Teologieee Tydskrif, 1(3): 48 et seq, Jun 1960; 
Etiese aard en etiese norm. Philo8ophia Reforwnata, 28:170-96, 
1963 and Opskorting van die etiese? (1966).
5. Cf L Kalsbeek, Contours of a Christian Philosophy. Toronto,
Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1975. p 100.
6. Cf P G W du Plessis: Aspekte van praktikalisme en etisisme. 
lets oor die gelykskakeling van die praktiese en die etiese 
lewe. Correspondentiebladen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische 
Wijsbegeerte, 22:18-22, Dec 1958.
7. Cf P G W du Plessis, op cit, p 20.
8. According to S P van der Walt not only the relation to one's 
fellowmen but also the relation towards the rest of creation 
(plants, animals etc) and even the relationship to God is 
the field of investigation of Ethics. Cf his essay Etiek - 
Wetenskap van relasies, In Truth and reality (1971) , p 222­
33.
9. Cf P G W du Plessis, Philosophia Reforwnata, 28:188-90, 1963;
J H Olthuis: Foote, values and ethics (1968), 200-1; J H 01= 
thuis: Towards reconstruction in ethics: a proposal.
R E S  Theological Bulletin, 2(4):6—8 Dec 1974.
10. Cf Olthuis, Towards reconstruction in ethics, p 8.
11. Cf J A L Taljaard, "Teorie en Praktyk" Perspektief (Potchef= 
stroom), 1(3):28-41 October 1962 and J W Tunderman,
219
"Wijsbegeerte en Levenspractijk", In H J & J M Spier,
Wijsbegeerte en Levenspractijk. Kampen, Kok# 1948, p 7-24.
2. Cf The essay of H E Runner: "Scientific and Pre-Scientific" 
In Christian Perspectives 1961. Hamilton, Ontario, Guardian 
Pub Co, 1961, p 11-52.
3. Cf K J Popma: Levensbeschouuing V. Amsterdam, Bui j ten & 
Schipperheijn, 1962, p 39.
4. Cf Runner, op cit, p 41.
5. The viewpoints of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Richard Niebuhr.
6. Cf F N von Meyenfeldt, The meaning of ethos ( 1974), p 38, 57.
7. According to most Calvinistic philosophers the root or 
nuclear-meaning of the ethical is love. Cf H Dooyeweerd
A new critique of theoretical thought Vol I, p 48 and II, 152-59 
(" temporal relationships of love"); H G Stoker: Teologie= 
se, wysgerige en vakwetenskaplike Etiek, In Oorsprong en 
Rigting I (1967) p 227 ("persoonsliefde"); 'n Wysgerige 
benadering van die sedelike, In Oorsprong en Rigting I 
(1967), 250-51 ("persoonsbehartiging"); Wysbegeerte van 
die Skeppingsidee, In Oorsprong en Rigting II (1970), p 285 
("Persoonsbehartiging ... d w s persoonsliefde") and 
Beginsels en metodes in die wetenskap (1969), p 165 ("persoon-, 
m a w  self- en naasteliefde") ; A Troost, Casuïstiek en 
Situatie - Ethiek, (1958), p 40, 48, 110, 116, 345 ("naaste^ 
liefde"); H van Riessen, Wijsbegeerte (1970), p 182 and 188 
("liefde"); E A Venter, Wysgerige Temas (s j), p 35-37 
("persoonlikheidsliefde" d w s "self- en naasteliefde").
18. Cf J H Olthuis, Facts, Values and Ethics. (1968), p 199.
19. J H Olthuis, I pledge you my troth (197 5) , p 21. We find 
Olthuis' viewpoint also in the publications of predecessors 
like D H Th Vollenhoven, Isagoogê Philosophiae3 (1943, reprint 
1967), p 24; J A L Taljaard, Die mens, die liefde en die 
sedelike, Koers, 23(6) : 19, 1956 and K J Popma, Inleiding in 
de Wi jsbegeerte (1956), p 17.
20. J W Tunderman, op cit, p 22 correctly stated: "Wie ... 
meent, dat de practijk zelf-genoegzaam is en van opvatting 
is, dat hij zich met een glimlach van alle wijsgerige be= 
zinning kan afkeren, zal daarmede blijk geven, zonder het 
te weten, slachtoffer te zijn van een bepaalde wijsgerige 
opvatting nl het practicistische".
220
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (Calvi^istic literature on Ethics)
Dooyeweerd, H # A new critique of theoretical thought. Vol II. 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1! J Paris/The Presbyterian and 
Reformed Pub Co, 1955.
Da Plessis, P G W, Aspekte van praktikalisme en etisisme. lets 
oor die gelykskakeling tussen die praktiese en die etiese 
lewe. Correspondentiebladen van de veveniging voor Calvinistisahe 
Wijsbegeerte. 22:18-22, Dec 1958.
Du Plessis, P G W, Enkele gesigspunte in die huidigo *otiek. 
Nederduits Geref Teol Tydskrif 1(3):48 et seq, Jun 1960.
Du Plessis, P G W, Etiese aard en etiese norm. Philosophic 
Reformata 28:170-96, 1963. (Summary on p 195-196)
Du Plessis, P G W, Grepe uit die eksistensialistiese etiek.
Koers 25(3)? 207-214, Dec 1957.
Du Plessis, P G W, Opskorting van die etiese? Die etiese behore 
by M Heidegger, K Jaspers, J-P Sartre en S de Beauvoir. (With 
summary) Potchefstroom, Pro Rege-Pers, 1966.
Duvenage, B, Veranderende norme of 'n pleidooi vir * n Calvinis= 
tiese Deontologie. (In Besinning en Uitsig. Potchefstroom,
PU vir CHO, 1971.) p 93-112.
Kalsbeek, L, Contours of a Christian Philosophy (ed by B S J 
Zylstra) Toronto, Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1975.
Olthuis, J H, Facts, values and ethics. A confrontation with 
twentieth century British moral philosophy in particular 
G E Moore. Assen, Van Gorcum & Co, 1968.
Olthuis, J H, I pledge you my troth. A Christian view of
marriage, family and friendship. New York, Harper & Row, 1975.
Olthuis, J H, Towards a reconstruction in ethics: a proposal.
Reformed Ecumenical Synod Theological Bulletint 2(4), Dec 1974.
Popma, K J, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte. Kampen, Kok, 1956.
Stoker, H G, Beginsels en metodes in die wetenskap. Johannes= 
burg, Boekhandel de Jong, 1969.
Stoker, H G, Teologiese, wysgerige en vakwetenskaplike etiek.
In Oorsprong en Rigting I, Kaapstad, Tafelberg Uitgewers, 1967. 
p 223-230.
Stoker, H G, Die Wysbegeerte van die Skeppingsidee. In Oorsprong 
en Rigting II. Kaapstad, Tafelberg Uitgewers, 1970. p 202-330.
Stoker, H G, 'n Wysgerige benadering van die Sedelike. In Oor= 
sprong en Rigting I. Kaapstad, Tafelberg Uitgewers, 1967. 
p 231-283.
Taljaard, J A L, Die mens, die liefde en die sedelike. Koers 
23(6):295-3l8, June 1956.
Troost, A, Casuistiek en Situatie-Ethiek. Utrecht, Drukkerij 
Libertas, 1958.
Van der Walt, S P, Etiek-Wetenskap van relasies. In Truth and 
reality. Philosophical perspectives on reality dedicated to 
prof H G Stoker. Braamfontein, De Jong's Bookshop, 1971.
221
p 222-233.
Van Riessen, H, Wijsbegeerte. Kampen, Kok, 1970.
Venter, E A, Etiek: mens en medemens. (In Wysgerige Temas. 
Bloemfontein, SACUM, s j) p 35-39.
Vollenhoven, D H Th, Isagoogê Philosophiae. Amsterdam, Filoso= 
fisch Instituut de Vrije Universiteit, 1967.
Von Meyenfeldt, F H The meaning of ethos. (Christian Perspec= 
tives Series, 1974). Hamilton, Ontario, ARSS, 1974.
222
